Contents

Chapter 1: Mind 1

1. Philosophy of mind and the study of mental phenomena 1

We have a scientific view of ourselves and a non-scientific view;

philosophy has preoccupied itself with the question of if (and how)

these views are compatible; but there is a prior question: what is the

content of the non-scientific view we have of ourselves?

2. Perspectives and points of view 4

The idea that having a mind is having a perspective on things, or on

the world, introduced; the distinction between those creatures with a

perspective and those without is vague, but it matches the vagueness

in the concept of a mind.

3. Perspectives and their objects 6

Two features of a perspective introduced: objects are presented

within perspectives, and perspectives are partial, they let in some

things and leave out others. These correspond to the two defining

features of intentionality: ‘directedness’ and ‘aspectual shape’.

4. The origin of the concepts of intentionality and intension 8

The origin of the term ‘intentionality’ explained; intentionality as a

mental feature should be distinguished from the logical feature,

intensionality; the connection and difference between these ideas

explained.

5. Directedness and intentional objects 13

All intentional phenomena have two essential features: directedness

upon an object and aspectual shape; the idea of an intentional object

introduced; intentional objects are not a kind of thing; an intentional

object is what is thought about.

6. Aspectual shape and intentional content 18

Aspectual shape is the way in which something is apprehended in an

intentional state or act; connections and differences are described

between the idea of aspectual shape and Frege’s idea of sense; for a

state to have intentional content is for it to have an intentional object

and a certain aspectual shape.

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7. The problem of intentionality 22

Various things are called the problem of intentionality: the problem

discussed here is the problem of how intentional states can concern

things that do not exist; the best solution is to deny that intentional

states are relations to genuinely existing objects; internalism and

externalism introduced.

8. The structure of intentionality 28

All intentional states have intentional objects (something they are

about) but they are not relations to these objects; rather, intentional

states are relations to intentional contents; intentional contents need

not be propositional; intentional modes introduced; the relational

structure of an intentional state is subject—mode—content.

Chapter 2: Body 34

9. Interaction between mind and body 34

Descartes’s view that he is not lodged in his body like a pilot in a

ship endorsed; the mind and the body do interact causally; this is

taken as a starting point for debate, not something which is in need

of defence.

10. Substance, property, event 35

Some basic metaphysical categories introduced; substance

distinguished from attribute or property; a state is a thing having

a property at a time; states are distinguished from events on the

grounds that events are particulars with temporal parts; mental

phenomena comprise both mental states and mental events (or

‘acts’).

11. The ‘intelligibility’ of mental causation 40

Mental-physical causation may be considered problematic because of

something about causation or something about the mental, or

something about the physical; the first two of these dismissed; the

problem of mental causation is a result of ‘physicalist’ assumptions

about the physical world.

12. Physics and physicalism 43

Physicalism distinguished from monism in general and from

materialism; physicalism gives a special role to physics; the

‘generality of physics’ distinguished from the ‘completeness of

physics’ and the ‘explanatory adequacy of physics’.

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13. The problem of mental causation for dualists 48

The problem arises from the apparent conflict between mental

causation and the completeness of physics; overdetermination of

mental and physical causes ruled out.

14. The identity theory 51

The identity theory solves the problem of mental causation by

identifying mental and physical causes; which version of the identity

theory is accepted depends on what the relata of causation are

(events or properties).

15. Reductionism 54

The identity theory is an ontologically reductionist theory;

ontological reduction distinguished from explanatory reduction, a

relation between theories; the two types of reduction are independent.

16. Against the identity theory: anti-reductionism 55

The identity theory is implausible because of Putnam’s variable or

multiple realization argument; ontological reduction should

therefore be rejected.

17. The problem of mental causation for non-reductive physicalism gg

If ontological reduction is denied, then the problem of mental

causation returns for non-reductive physicalism; the non-reductive

physicalist response is to hold that the mental is necessarily

determined by the physical; the difficulties with this view discussed.

18. Emergence 62

An alternative non-physicalist position introduced: mental

properties are ‘emergent’ properties with their own causal powers;

this position denies the completeness of physics.

19. Physicalism as the source of the mind–body problem 66

Some see physicalism as the source of the mind–body problem, not

its solution; the problem here is how to explain the place of

consciousness in the physical world; the contemporary mind–body

problem as a dilemma: if the mind is not physical, then how can it

have physical effects? But if the mind is physical, how can we

understand consciousness?

20. What does a solution to the mind–body problem tell us about the

mind? 68

Whether the identity theory, non-reductive physicalism, or

emergentism are true does not tell us much of interest about the

nature of mental properties themselves.

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Chapter 3: Consciousness 70

21. The conscious and the unconscious 70

Different senses of ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ distinguished;

Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness

discussed; our concern is with phenomenal consciousness: a state is

phenomenally conscious when there is something it is like to be in

that state.

22. The distinction between the intentional and the qualitative 74

Mental phenomena are often divided into intentional and

qualitative phenomena; this distinction is not very clear; many

intentional states are phenomenally conscious; qualitative states are a

variety of phenomenally conscious states, those having a sensory

character.

23. Qualia 76

The term ‘qualia’ defined: qualia are non-intentional conscious

mental properties; it is a substantial thesis that qualitative character

is explicable in terms of qualia.

24. The intentionality of bodily sensation 78

Bodily sensation examined as the apparently best case for a nonintentionalist

view of the mind; a proper conception of bodily

sensation shows it to be intentional in the sense of $8; bodily

sensations are ways of being aware of one’s body.

25. Strong intentionalism and weak intentionalism 83

Intentionalists believe that all mental states or acts are intentional;

weak intentionalists hold that some intentional states or acts also

have qualia which account for their phenomenal character; strong

intentionalists deny this; strong intentionalism defended.

26. Physicalism, consciousness, and qualia 88

The problems of consciousness for physicalism revisited; these

problems do not depend on the existence of qualia; three arguments

distinguished: the explanatory gap, the knowledge argument, and the

zombie argument.

27. The explanatory gap 91

The explanatory gap argument claims that consciousness remains

beyond the explanatory reach of physicalism; this argument is shown

to rest either on excessively strong understandings of physicalism

and explanation, or on the zombie hypothesis.

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28. The knowledge argument examined 93

The knowledge argument is a sound argument against the view that

all facts are physical facts; but physicalism should not define itself in

that way.

29. Zombies 99

The zombie argument is effective against the forms of physicalism

discussed in $$iq and ip; if it is accepted, it provides a further

motivation for emergence.

30. The prospects for explaining consciousness 101

The prospects for a reductive account of consciousness

summarized.

Chapter 4: Thought 102

31. Thoughts and beliefs 102

The term ‘thought’ will be used for a kind of mental state or act, not

for the content of such states or acts.

32. Consciousness and belief 105

Belief, properly so-called, is never conscious; belief is a mental state,

not a mental act; what philosophers call ‘conscious belief’ is really

the event of becoming conscious of what one believes.

33. Propositional attitudes 108

Russell’s term ‘propositional attitude’ picks out those intentional

states whose intentional content is evaluable as true or false; the

nature of propositional content discussed; Fregean and neo-

Russellian accounts compared.

34. The propositional attitude thesis 112

The thesis that all intentional states are propositional attitudes

introduced and rejected; the thesis is unmotivated and it has obvious

counter-examples.

35. De re and de dicto attitudes 114

Thoughts and attitudes can be described in a ‘de re’ or relational

style as well as in the more usual ‘de dicto’ style; the fact that there

are such de re ascriptions does not imply that there is a category of

de re thoughts or attitudes; the nature of intentional states can be

separated from the conditions for their ascription.

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36. Internalism and externalism 117

Externalists about intentionality believe that some intentional states

or acts constitutively depend on the existence of their objects, while

the strongest form of internalism denies this; it is argued that

internalist intentionality is coherent, and that there is no prima facie

intuitive case in favour of externalism.

37. The argument for externalism 121

Externalists employ the influential ‘Twin Earth’ argument in favour

of their position; internalists may challenge this argument in two

ways; the most plausible way is to deny the externalist’s claim that

content determines reference; no positive argument for internalism is

provided, though.

38. Demonstrative thought 126

Demonstrative thoughts (‘that F is G’) have been claimed to be

another source of externalist arguments; much of what externalists

claim about demonstrative thought can be accepted by

internalists.

39. The prospects for explaining thought 128

The prospects for a reductive account of thought or intentionality

briefly considered.

Chapter 5: Perception 130

40. The problem of perception 130

The phenomenological problem of perception distinguished from

the epistemological and psychological problems; the

phenomenological problem is a result of the conflict between the

immediacy of perception and the ‘Phenomenal Principle’, once one

allows the possibility of perfect hallucination.

41. The argument from illusion 132

The argument outlined, and its most plausible version defended; the

argument is shown to rest on the ‘Phenomenal Principle’.

42. Perception as a form of intentionality 137

The way to solve the problem of perception is to give a correct

account of the intentionality of perception; the ‘Phenomenal

Principle’ rejected; the nature of perceptual contents and modes

examined.

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43. The phenomenal character of perceptual experience 140

It is sometimes said that an intentionalist view of perception cannot

account for the phenomenal character of perception; two kinds of

evidence for this claim considered: introspective evidence and

inverted spectrum/earth thought-experiments; introspective

evidence shown to be inconclusive, once we understand

intentionality in the proper way.

44. Inverted spectrum, Inverted Earth 145

The inverted spectrum possibility (if it is one) presents no knockdown

argument against intentionalism; Inverted Earth only presents

a problem for a purely externalist version of intentionalism; if

narrow perceptual content is coherent, then the inverted earth

argument is unsuccessful.

45. Perception as non-conceptual 150

A further aspect of the phenomenal character of perception

introduced: its distinctness from belief and judgement; this is

expressed by saying that perceptions have non-conceptual contents;

this idea is clarified, motivated, and defended against its critics.

Endnotes 157

References 169

Index 179